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Abstract: 
This article presents adaptive heuristics as an alternative approach to navigate uncertainty in 
project decision-making. Adaptive heuristic are a class of simple decision strategies that have 
received only scant attention in project studies. Yet, they can strive in contexts of high 
uncertainty and limited information, which are the typical project decision context. 
This article develops a conceptual model that supports a systematic connection between 
adaptive heuristics and project decisions. Individual adaptive heuristics succeed only in 
specific decision environments, in which they are ‘ecologically rational’. The model builds on 
the individual definitions of ecological rationality and organizes them according to two types 
of uncertainty (‘knowable’ and ‘unknowable’). Decision problems and heuristics are 
furthermore grouped by decision task (choice and judgement). The article discusses several 
resulting propositions for future research and analyses the scant project literature on heuristics 
with regard to its fit to the model and the propositions. 
This conceptual approach supports future prescriptive research that can foster the 
development of efficient and intuitively applicable decision support tools. It finally highlights 
current boundaries of research on adaptive heuristics regarding the missing reflection of 
different types of uncertainty. 
  
  
 Introduction 
Projects take place in ambiguous and evolving environments. These environments require 
continuous, repeated and fast paced decisions. Yet, the information to ground these decisions 
in is often limited, intertwined and ambiguous, historical data is scarce, and personal 
relationships are complex. In short: project decisions are taken in an environment of 
particularly high uncertainty. 
Many rational and normative approaches have been put forward to navigate this uncertainty, 
and to support project decision-making (Rolstadås et al., 2014). However, these approaches 
are typically information and time demanding, sometimes difficult to apply, and in 
consequence not always well accepted in practice (Hartono and Yap, 2011) . Indeed, 
practitioners often stress the importance of expertise and intuition (Leybourne and Sadler-
Smith, 2006). While the success of either ‘rational’ and intuitive decision strategies is 
debated, reliable decision strategies that come more naturally to the pre-existing professional 
practice are likely to receive higher adoption. 
In this paper, we will introduce such an alternative approach for project decision support. We 
will build on the concept of ‘adaptive heuristics’ (e.g. Gigerenzer et al., 2011; Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Adaptive heuristics are simple decision strategies that, similar to intuitive 
reasoning, build on experience, limited information, and are useful in situations of high 
uncertainty. Yet, they have demonstrated to be robust and reliable decision strategies in 
complex, ambiguous and uncertain managerial decision contexts, such as evaluating business 
opportunities, identifying active customers, or real-estate choices (Artinger et al., 2015). 
Overall, research suggests that adaptive heuristics permit constructing decision strategies that 
are both efficient (fast) and effective (frugal), and are more in line with ‘natural’ cognitive 
processes of expert reasoning (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). Finally, adaptive heuristics 
facilitate eliciting and sharing expert knowledge (Rieskamp and Otto, 2011), hence allow the 
discussion, formalization, testing and teaching of expert judgement. In this regard, adaptive 
heuristics act as an vehicle to turn tacit into explicit knowledge (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 
2011), and contribute not only to constructing fast and frugal decision strategies, but also to 
learning in project organizing.  
In summary, project decisions usually take place in an environment in which adaptive 
heuristics can strive, while more information demanding approaches struggle: high 
uncertainty, high time pressure, limited historical data, and reliance on expert intuition. They 
are adopted intuitively and can be used as mechanisms for learning and reflection in practice. 
Yet, project studies have only very recently started to explore heuristics as decision strategies 
(Albar and Jetter, 2011; Eriksson and Kadefors, 2017; Hartono and Yap, 2011; Mathews, 
2010).  
The aim of this paper is to introduce adaptive heuristics to the project domain, and argue how 
project studies and practice can profit from their application. Our argument will build on a 
"Borrowing and Extending" approach (Zahra and Newey, 2009). We will theorize at the 
interface of adaptive heuristics and project studies to spark research in a new context that can 
inform back to research on adaptive heuristics.  
As the name suggests, adaptive heuristics are only suitable in a specific decision environment, 
an environment in which they are ‘ecologically rational’. Therefore, this article asks: What 
kind of adaptive heuristics can support different project decisions, and why? 
To link existing research in other domains with potential applications in projects, we will 
propose a new conceptual model of heuristics and decisions. The proposed model reflects the 
decision context through the dimensions uncertainty type and decision task. This provides a 
systematic connection between adaptive heuristics and project decisions, providing a starting 
point for future prescriptive research. 
With this paper, we contribute to project studies, project practitioners and the growing 
research community studying adaptive heuristics. In the domain of project studies, we provide 
an alternative theory for prescriptive research on decisions, and a new theoretical lens to 
analyse observed decision-making behaviour. Regarding project practice, adaptive heuristics 
can foster the development of new effective and intuitively applicable decision support tools. 
Finally, we purport to contribute beyond project studies to the adaptive heuristics research 
community by providing a new way of organizing adaptive heuristics based on the decision 
environment in which they strive.  
The paper has five parts. First, we will provide an overview of the literature on project 
decisions, and establish the research gap on application of adaptive heuristics. Second, 
follows the presentation of adaptive heuristics and their key theoretical concepts. Third, we 
will introduce a simple conceptual model that allows common classification of decision types 
and adaptive heuristics. Fourth, we present three key propositions building on the model, and 
reflect the scant literature on adaptive heuristics in projects through the lens of the model. 
Fifth, we will provide a discussion of the model and its limitations, and conclude with an 
outlook on future research. 
 Literature review: project decisions 
Decision-making is a core task in projects, consequently the literature on project decision is 
abundant, covering a broad range of decision types and theoretical angles. Broadly, the 
literature can be grouped in two areas: the normative, and the descriptive (Rolstadås et al., 
2014). In their review of behavioural decision-making, Stingl and Geraldi (2017) identified 
386 publications in key project journals addressing decisions, of which only 88 were 
descriptive, discussing behavioural decision-making. Hence, the main body of project 
decision research is concerned with normative decision theory and, foremost, decision support 
tools to accommodate normative views on rational decision-making.  
Decision support tools in the literature have matured in complexity and sophistication. 
Different probabilistic approaches for project decision-making, building on expected value 
models, have been proposed since the mid of the past century. Historical examples are 
Pound’s Pairwise-Comparison for selection of research projects (1964), the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) proposed by Saaty in the 1980ies (for a review in projects see Al-
Subhi Al-Harbi, 2001), decision trees for solving multiple constrained resource scheduling 
problems (Patterson, 1984), or the Program Evaluation and Review Technic (PERT) for a 
stochastic approach to project scheduling (Miller, 1962). Rolstadås et al. (2014) provide a 
comprehensive overview of classical and advanced deterministic and stochastic methods in 
their book “Decision Making in Projects” 
Starting in the 1990ies, classical probabilistic decision theory was supplemented by fuzzy 
theory as an alternative to the classical decision support methods (e.g. Zeng et al. 2007), or to 
supplement established methods like AHP (e.g. Huang et al., 2008). Finally, increasing 
computing capabilities opened the possibilities for neural network based approaches (e.g. 
Chaphalkar et al., 2015) or data mining (e.g. Art Chaovalitwongse et al., 2012) 
A common denominator of the decision support tools in the literature is high information 
demand, and increased complexity. This results in decreased transparency of the tools and a 
need for specialized experts. Contrary to the reported good performance of these tools, 
acceptance among practitioners is often low, as e.g. discussed by Hartono and Yap (2011) on 
the use of prescriptive models for mark-up decisions in the construction industry.  
The descriptive stream on project decisions is concerned with the study of individual and 
group decision-making behaviour According to Stingl and Geraldi (2017), the research on 
behavioural decision-making can be grouped into three schools of thought: the Reductionist 
school that explores cognitive limitations; the Pluralist school that analyses opportunistic and 
political behaviour; and the Contextualist school that discusses sensemaking processes 
(Weick, 1995) in project decision-making.  
Within the Reductionist school, the topic of cognitive biases dominates the academic 
discussion (e.g. Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003; Shore, 2008). This stream of literature is 
rooted in the concept of heuristics and biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), and thus aims 
at identifying behavioural deviations from rational, normative decision-making, and 
suggesting de-biasing strategies. 
However, as Stingl and Geraldi (2017) highlighted, general decision science literature also 
positively discusses heuristics as successful decision strategies. Their review indicated that 
this discussion is currently not extended to project studies.  
We performed an additional literature search for this paper, identifying project literature 
referring to key publications on adaptive heuristics. As shown in Table 1, we identified only 
four recent publications in the field that build explicitly on adaptive heuristics. Further three 
aligned publications contribute to adaptive heuristics but do not build on it explicitly. 
Four of these publications explicitly evaluated the effectiveness of the applied strategy. The 
remaining three publications were descriptive, discussing practitioners’ use of heuristics in 
their decision-making. In a nutshell, the research demonstrated that adaptive heuristics are 
used in project decisions, that they seem to perform well when compared with regression 
models. However, not all heuristics are equally suitable to a specific decision problem.  
Table 1 - Overview of literature on heuristics in project publications 
 Explicit link to heuristics Aim of study 
Albar and Jetter, 2011 Yes Prescriptive 
Eriksson and Kadefors, 2017 Yes Descriptive 
Hartono and Yap, 2011 Yes Descriptive 
Mathews, 2010 Yes Descriptive 
Maytorena et al., 2007 No Descriptive/ Prescriptive 
Van Oorschot et al., 2011 No Descriptive/ Prescriptive 
Winch and Maytorena, 2009 No Descriptive/ Prescriptive 
 
Thus, while there is a slow rise in interest in adaptive heuristics as a lens to understand expert 
decision-making in projects, it is not yet systematically considered as a tool to improve 
project decision-making.  
This paper will develop a holistic view on adaptive heuristics that supports prescriptive 
research. This shall foster the development of novel project decision tools that reconcile the 
need for both intuitive and analytical decision support.  
 Theoretical background - adaptive heuristics 
Heuristics are simple decision strategies that deliberately omit some of the available 
information to make fast inferences. They are often linked with the concept of cognitive short 
cuts, as this type of reasoning is similar to the natural cognitive processes during fast 
decision-making of humans and other animals (Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). Yet, 
heuristics as a theoretical concept go beyond the idea of simplifying strategies that introduce 
bias and error. Still, it is particularly the latter notion that receives significant attention in both 
general and project decision literature, following a research stream rooted in Tversky and 
Kahneman’s seminal paper “Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases” (1974). 
The difference between the ‘heuristics and biases’ program and the ‘simple heuristics’1 
program proposed by Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) is a philosophical one, with 
fundamentally different ontological and epistemological views. 
The ontological gap roots in the different view on heuristics as either helpful tools or 
introducers of error. While both programs agree that heuristics produce – to some extent – 
inaccurate assessments, the simple heuristics program has systematically questioned the 
‘accuracy-effort-trade-off’-paradigm. The assumption of this paradigm is that higher effort, 
i.e. better models and more knowledge, will inevitably lead to more accurate decisions. 
However, the discussion of the bias-variance-dilemma by Brighton and Gigerenzer (2015) 
provided examples and mathematical arguments, why and where simplistic models may – in 
highly complex and uncertain environments – be more accurate in prediction than 
sophisticated mathematical models. This systematic analysis is in line with prior findings in 
which simple heuristics performed well for realistic judgement problems (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier, 2011 and references therein).   
The epistemological difference of the two programs relates to the type of research that is 
pursued by the programs. The heuristics and bias program is foremost output-oriented and 
hence purely descriptive, identifying the roots and consequential biases for individual 
heuristics. An example is the well-studied effect of perceived self-efficacy on over-optimistic 
project forecasts (Sengupta et al., 2008). The adaptive heuristics program, on the other hand, 
assumes a process-oriented view with an additional prescriptive aim. It explores the decision 
process itself, what information is considered (further referred to as: cues), and in which way. 
It furthermore tackles the question: how good does a specific heuristic perform as decision 
strategy, compared to other heuristics and conventional decision models? 
This research program has subsequently identified a variety of different heuristics that 
succeed in specific decision problems. An overview of six selected adaptive heuristics is 
given in   
                                                 
1 The literature uses different terms for the same concept, e.g. adaptive heuristics, simple heuristics, or fast-and-
frugal heuristics, etc. For simplicity, we will refer to this class as ‘adaptive heuristics’ or simply ‘heuristics’ 
across the remainder of the article.
 
Table 2.  
Table 2 – Six examples of well researched adaptive heuristics (from Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009), abridged2) 
Adaptive Heuristic Definition 
Recognition 
heuristic  
If one of two alternatives is recognized, infer that it has the higher value on the 
criterion. 
Take-the-best  To infer which of two alternatives has the higher value, go through cues in order of 
validity until there is a cue that discriminates the two alternatives, then pick the 
alternative this cue favours. 
Tallying To estimate a criterion, do not estimate weights but simply count the number of 
positive cues. 
Satisficing Search through alternatives and choose the first one that exceeds your aspiration 
level. 
Imitate the majority  Consider the majority of people in your peer group and imitate their behaviour. 
Fast-and-Frugal-
Trees 
Skimmed down decision tree with each node connecting only to one further node and 
an exit. 
 
Following the particular onto-epistemological stance, there are two cornerstone concepts in 
behind heuristics: ecological rationality and a basic descriptive structure of the process. 
 
Ecological rationality is a concept that follows the argument of Simon’s Scissors (1990). 
Simon claimed that rationality is not only bounded by the decision-maker’s cognitive 
limitations, but is also a consequence of the task environment, e.g. the fuzziness of 
information, the potential to learn, or the possibility to change choices. Therefore, Gigerenzer 
and Brighton (2009) claim that there is not only rational and irrational behaviour, as is the key 
assumption of the heuristics and biases program, but also an ecologically rational behaviour. 
This refers to the rational choice of a heuristic as decision strategy, based on its suitability to 
the context of the specific decision problem. 
Individual definitions of conditions in which a heuristic is ecologically rational are varying in 
specificity and focus (cf. Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). Broadly, the defining parameters 
can be separated in two groups: those oriented towards the predictive validity of specific 
elements of the heuristic, and those defined through a more general description of the 
environmental factors of the decision.  
                                                 
2 Fast-and-Frugal-Trees added from Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011) 
The first group considers attributes of cues (validity, variance of validity, redundancy) that 
favour good approximations of the ‘right’ answer. For example, for the Recognition heuristic, 
the definition is “recognition validity >.5” (ibid p.130), i.e. the heuristic is ecologically 
rational if in random samplings of e.g. city names, the recognition of one of the two names 
has a > 50% probability of predicting the bigger city correctly. 
The second group is following environmental parameters like a rapidly decreasing number of 
alternatives (Satisficing), or lack of learning opportunities (Imitate the Successful). The 
underlying assumption for these definitions is that we cannot obtain the ‘right answer’ but 
rather only ‘good enough answers’.  
 
The identified structural elements of heuristics are an output of the process oriented 
research. The described elements serve as a common framework to describe heuristics. These 
three elements are: first, a search rule, defining the way in which information is gathered; 
second, a stopping rule, defining the end of the information search; third, a decision rule, 
defining how the gathered information informs the decision. 
Examples of this structure (taken from Artinger et al. (2015)) are, e.g. for Recognition (p. 42):  
(1) Search for an object that you recognize.  
(2) Stop as soon as one object is recognized.  
(3) Infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.  
Or alternatively for Satisficing (ibid, p. 40):  
(1) Set an aspiration level and search through objects.  
(2) Stop search when the first object meets the set aspiration level.  
(3) Choose this object.  
 
Heuristics are an emerging field, and new heuristics are identified across different application 
domains. Hence systematic presentations organize them differently according to the intended 
use. However, the comprehensive typologies presented by e.g. Gigerenzer and Gaissmair 
(2011) or Artinger et al. (2015), follow the structure of the heuristic but not the context in 
which they are ecologically rational. 
 A conceptual model of project decisions 
As discussed in the literature review, heuristics have received scant attention from project 
scholars. The key limitation of current research is the focus on descriptive models and limited 
attention to prescriptive results, which can provide useful alternatives to current decision 
practices.  
The key for such prescriptive models is the concept of ecological rationality, i.e. the link 
between individual heuristics and specific decision contexts in which they can succeed. We 
argue that available approaches fail to create a systematic, conceptual link between decision 
context and successful heuristics because of two reasons: First, current typologies focus on 
structure of the heuristic rather than a systematic grouping by conditions for ecological 
rationality. This clouds potential applications of the concepts to other fields. Second, current 
research is organized around an empirical understanding of heuristics. Given the diversity of 
real-world decision contexts, this spotlight-approach without systematic discussion of the 
context, does not inform deduction of other applications in which these heuristics may strive.  
We suggest that research will benefit from a more conceptual understanding that builds on a 
systematic link between decision context and definitions of ecological rationality. Neither the 
literature on heuristics nor project studies have yet taken the bold step to connect findings into 
a conceptual model.  
The model presented in this section contributes to closing this gap. We build on the individual 
definitions of ecological rationality, but organize them in a manner relevant and applicable to 
project decisions. Thereby, this model allows systematic and analytic linking of the decision 
context with suitable heuristics.  
The proposed conceptual model builds on two key considerations. First, ecological rationality 
is defined through certain specific characteristics of the decision. Second, project decisions 
typically consist of several judgement and choice tasks, which can be individually supported 
through heuristics.  
Hence, the dimensions of the conceptual model are decision characteristics (represented by 
type of uncertainty) and individual decision tasks (represented by judgement and choice). The 
next two sections explain and describe these concepts. 
a. Decision context: Type of uncertainty 
To characterise the decision context, we follow different definitions of ecological rationality. 
As stated in the discussion of the theoretical background, there are two well distinguishable 
groups of heuristics: the ones that seek to approximate the ‘right’ answer, and those that aim 
for the ‘good enough’. These two philosophies imply two different uncertainty concepts. 
Comparable notions are already present in the project literature: e.g. Zhang et al.’s (2011) 
separation of ‘risk as objective fact’ vs. ‘risk as a subjective construction’, or Sanderson’s 
(2012) classifications: a priori  and statistical probability, and subjective and socialized 
probability. 
Yet, we rely on a more abstract concept to make the philosophical differences explicit. 
Therefore, we build on and expand the concept of two uncertainty types proposed by Colyvan  
(2008, p. 646): first, “uncertainty about some underlying fact of the matter” (type A), and 
second, “uncertainty where there is no fact of the matter” (type B). We expand this concept 
insofar, as Colyvan only referred to uncertainty about a current state, but not uncertainty 
regarding the future.  
For the purpose of this paper, uncertainty refers to the potential error of an estimation that has 
been made regarding the current or future value of a criterion (e.g. profit, technical 
performance, customer acceptance)3. Hence, the potential margin of error defines the 
uncertainty of this estimation. If the potential margin of error is low, so is the uncertainty, and 
vice-verse. For estimations based on mathematical models, like linear regression or heuristics, 
the margin of total error is described as the sum of the model variance, the model bias 
squared, and random, irreducible noise (Brighton and Gigerenzer, 2015). 
Total error = variance + bias2 + noise 
The model variance is a result of the fuzziness of the individual cues used in the model and 
increases with the number of cues. The bias is a function of the model accuracy in terms of 
representing reality. Noise is a random term, specific to the decision problem.  
In type A uncertainty, the influence of the random noise on the overall error of the judgement 
will be marginal. The potential of error, the uncertainty, results from the variance and the bias 
                                                 
3 At this point, we do not discriminate between uncertainty with known probabilities (cf. ‘risk’ in the classical 
definition by Knight) and unknown probabilities. 
in the model applied for the estimation. Type A uncertainty is at the centre of most traditional 
approaches dealing with uncertainty. The underlying assumption is the existence of a 
knowable and objective truth, either as deterministic or stochastic process with defined, 
narrow probabilities (as opposed to ‘flat tails’). We therefore refer to this type as ‘knowable 
uncertainty’, which results from missing knowledge and information. This uncertainty may be 
reduced or even eliminated by gathering further insight.  
Moreover, for Type A, uncertainty will naturally decrease as the moment of materialisation 
approaches. For example, the estimations of when a certain supplier will deliver a critical 
part, or what the performance of a newly designed system will be, will increase in accuracy 
over time. While it may not be economically sensible to gather full knowledge, knowable 
uncertainty builds on the notion that full knowledge is, in principle, achievable.  
In contrast, type B uncertainty cannot be eliminated through further gathering of knowledge. 
We therefore refer to is as ‘unknowable uncertainty’. In Colyvan’s discussion, this type of 
uncertainty results from linguistic vagueness, e.g. context depending, subjective interpretation 
of terms. This applies particularly to the issue of project success (Kreiner, 2014), which is 
driven by different and evolving stakeholder perceptions. We expand Colyvan’s type B by 
including unknowable future developments. This expansion introduces ‘unpredictability’ as 
either the consequence of randomness that follows an unknown or very broad probability 
distribution (‘fat tails’), or as ‘practical’ unpredictability, e.g. due to the complexity of a 
system, high pace of change, or an infeasible amount of data collection or modelling effort.  
This type of unknowable uncertainty is relevant to projects, as projects shape the future while 
they proceed, following new insights and changes in the environment (Kreiner, 1995; Pitsis et 
al., 2003). In any of these cases, it is the random, unknowable ‘noise’ that dominates the error, 
i.e. the uncertainty. Therefore, additional knowledge and attempts to improve the decision 
support model will not significantly reduce the uncertainty. Typical examples for this type of 
uncertainty are ‘black swans’, events with very low probability but high impact, like 
catastrophic weather events, the sudden absence of a key project member, or a critical 
incident at a production facility. Furthermore, this type of uncertainty affects any search for 
the ‘best’ alternative, be it technology, location, or staffing, where what is ‘best’, is a result of 
developments within the project.      
Typically, a mixture of both knowable and unknowable uncertainty affect project decisions. 
For example, the decision of whether to accelerate project completion may need consideration 
of: when would we finish without acceleration (Type A uncertainty in normal condition, Type 
B regarding rare events)? How effective will the acceleration action be (foremost Type A)? 
How will the customer react to a delay: is it even valuable to accelerate (Type B)? 
The differences are illustrated in the figures below. While Type A uncertainty decreases as the 
project progresses and more information is known about the project, Type B uncertainty is 
unknowable: it comes as a surprise and/or we cannot reduce the uncertainty by gathering 
more information. 
 
Figure 1 - Types of uncertainty: (1) knowable uncertainty, decreasing over time; (2) unknowable uncertainty, only 
resolved as event takes place; (3) uncertainty profile of typical project decisions. 
Coming back to the relevance of the noise term for uncertainty, this notion allows grouping of 
heuristics according to the environments in which they perform best. On the one hand are 
those heuristics that define their ecological rationality through the validity of individual or 
several cues and the cue environment. Hence, they evaluate the contribution of the cues to 
correct inferences (cf. “Recognition validity >0.5”). The aim is to reduce the total error, and 
to make fast-and-frugal inferences about a situation where information is limited. These 
heuristics build on the assumption of a knowable, correct decision, which is challenged by a 
lack of knowledge. Hence, they are connected with knowable uncertainty: the better the 
inferences of a decision strategy based on a limited set of cues, the better it is suited for the 
context.  
On the other hand are those heuristics for which the definition of ecological rationality 
follows a more general description of the decision environment. Those heuristics do in 
consequence not strive for one correct inference but a good-enough choice or judgement. This 
approach connects to managerial strategies suited to cope with unknowable uncertainty, e.g. 
robust (Perrow, 1999) or resilient strategies (Pich et al., 2002; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007), or 
even approaches in line with Taleb’s (2012) controversial notion of anti-fragility. 
Following the definitions of ecological rationality for different heuristics proposed in the 
literature, Table 3 groups selected heuristics into the two proposed categories of uncertainty. 
Table 3 - Definitions of ecological rationality (adapted from Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009) linked with types of 
uncertainty 
Heuristic Ecologically rational when  Type of uncertainty 
Recognition 
heuristic  
Recognition validity >0.5 Type A 
Take-the-best Specific cue environments (see Gigerenzer and Brighton, 
2009) that analytically have shown to achieve good fits to 
observations. 
Type A 
Tallying Cue validities vary little with low redundancy. Type A 
Satisficing Number of alternatives decreases rapidly. Type B 
Imitate the majority  Stable or slowly changing environment with costly or time-
consuming information search. 
Type B 
Fast-and-Frugal-
Trees 
Specific cue environments (see Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 
2011) that analytically have shown to achieve good fits to 
observations. 
Type A 
 
b. Decision task 
Various theoretical and descriptive models sketch decision-making. They disagree in their 
view on how individual decision tasks are made, how explicit these tasks are, whether all of 
them occur in all decisions, or whether they follow a particular order. Some descriptive 
studies have highlighted the ‘messiness’ of group decision-making (e.g. Lindblom’s 
‘muddling through’ (1959) or the ‘garbage can model’ by Cohen et al. (1972)). Yet, there is a 
wide consensus in behavioural decision-making that decisions involve individual decision 
tasks. Thus, decision tasks represent a common denominator across the literature.  
We therefore argue that a model including separable decision tasks – independent of whether 
they occur sequentially, in parallel, or interactively – is suited for the proposed research for 
two reasons. First, it is in line with the theoretical assumptions of heuristics which adopt a 
process-oriented view on cognition and reasoning. Second, a task view helps practitioners 
connect intuitively what kind of heuristics to use according to the kind of decision tasks they 
are currently undertaking. Hence, decision tasks are convenient for the development of 
prescriptive conceptual models on project decisions as it connects with the ‘making’ of the 
decision.  
The type of the decision task is moreover relevant because it delimitates the core question of 
what the decision is about. Through understanding the core question, it is easier to match 
generic project decision problems with existing research on heuristics. 
Available theoretical models provide a finely-granulated view on individual decision tasks, 
usually including at least the elements: problem identification/framing, alternative 
identification, alternative comparison, alternative selection, and implementation. Yet, these 
tasks can be grouped in two distinguishable categories (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981): 
judgement and choice. 
Judgment is concerned with the assessment of a current or future situation. This assessment 
may regard a state of things, e.g. whether the project is still on track, or causal relations in the 
socio-technical systems, e.g. the customer reaction to a claim. It does not imply a specific 
action or choice but rather informs the decision by providing an answer to the questions: 
Where are we? Where are we heading? What do we want? Or: how did we end up here? For 
example, when choosing a key supplier, we will judge project needs, whether and why the 
specific delivery is critical, the extend of our knowledge about our needs, potential suppliers 
in the market, our past relationships, etc.   
Choice, on the other hand, builds on factual information and/or judgements to select a 
particular course of action. It answers therefore the question of: How do we get to where we 
want to go? Going back to the example above, choice would be the actual decision for a 
specific supplier, based on our judgment of the situation. 
Project decisions usually contain several judgement and choice tasks in parallel or sequential. 
We argue that separating these and providing the right support for either – more than a 
holistic support tool for the entire decision – can contribute to increased efficiency and 
efficacy of the decision process. Moreover, heuristics can be easily grouped in those 
successfully supporting judgement tasks or choice tasks. 
To link the type of decision task – choice or judgement – with a specific heuristic, we rely on 
literature definitions of the structural elements, specifically the decision rule. These rules refer 
either to the estimation of a criterion value (judgement), or to a choice of action. Table 4 
groups selected heuristics into the two proposed categories of uncertainty. 
Table 4 - Structural definitions of heuristics (cited from Artinger et al., 2015)4. SeR: search rule, StR: stopping rule, 
DR: decision rule. 
Heuristic Structural definition  Decision Task 
Recognition 
heuristic  
SeR: Search for an object that you recognize. 
StR: Stop as soon as the object is recognized. 
DR: Infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the 
criterion 
Judgement 
Take-the-
best  
SeR: Order cues by their validity. 
StR: Stop on finding the first cue that discriminates between the alternatives. 
DR: Choose the alternative with the higher cue value. 
Choice 
Tallying SeR: Search through cues in any order, add positive cues to the tally, and 
deduct negative cues from it. 
StR: Stop after n cues 
DR: Decide for the alternative with the higher tally. If there is [..] a draw, 
guess. 
Choice 
Satisficing SeR: Set an aspiration level and search through objects.  
StR: Stop search when the first object meets the set aspiration level.  
DR: Choose this object. 
Choice 
Imitate-the-
majority  
SeR: Search through behaviour of individuals in your peer group. 
StR: Stop search when you have identified the behaviour of the majority. 
DR: Imitate this behaviour. 
Choice 
Fast-and-
Frugal Tree 
SeR: Search through cues in a predetermined order.  
StR: Stop search as soon as a cue leads to an exit.  
DR: Classify the object accordingly. 
Judgement 
 
 Uncertainty type and decision task combined  
Combining the two dimensions of uncertainty type and decision task, we obtain the 
conceptual model presented in Table 5. This model serves to address project decisions in a 
systematic way and is suitable to establish a systematic link to heuristics. 
                                                 
4 Except: Imitate-the-majority (following Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009)) and Fast-and-Frugal Trees (cited 
from Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011)) 
Table 5 - Conceptual model of project decision and heuristics, organized by uncertainty type and decision task. 
Definitions for the assignment of the heuristics in the model can be found in (1) Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009), (2) 
Artinger et al. (2015) and (3) Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011). 
 Type A (knowable) uncertainty  
 
Type B (unknowable) uncertainty  
 
Judgement Decision problem: estimations based 
on limited knowledge about situation 
or causalities 
Applicable heuristics, e.g.:  
- Fast-and-Frugal-Tree (3) 
- Recognition (1) 
- Fluency (1) 
- Similarity (2) 
Decision problem: estimations based 
on ambiguous meaning or 
unpredictable events 
Applicable heuristics: None (see 
main text)  
Choice Decision problem: Choice based on 
criteria for which there is limited 
knowledge 
Applicable heuristics, e.g.: 
- Take-the-best (1) 
- Tallying (1)  
Decision problem: Choice based on 
criteria for which it is impossible to 
gain a priori knowledge. 
Applicable heuristics e.g.: 
- Satisficing (1) 
- 1/N (equality heuristic) (1) 
- Imitate the majority / the 
successful (1) 
Tit-for-Tat (1)  
 
We argue that there are no suitable heuristics for judgements under unknowable (Type B) 
uncertainty (quadrant 2). This follows logically, as an accurate judgement is, by definition, 
not possible in this type of uncertainty. As the irreducible random noise defines the error of 
any judgement, predictive capabilities of any analytical approach will be low.   
This notion is crucial for the choice of strategies to manage uncertainty. In quadrant 2, there 
are two possible approaches: reduce the roots of unknowable uncertainty (e.g. clarify 
ambiguous or vague views of different stakeholders), or prepare for the unknown or 
unexpected through robust, resilient or anti-fragile strategies. 
Based on this model we make three propositions: 
1 2 
3 4 
First, the discussion of the two different types of probability highlights the necessity to review 
the notion of ‘predictive capability’. The core body of heuristic literature frames predictive 
capability following a factual, measurable a priori or a posteriori criterion. We claim that this 
is only suitable for Type A uncertainty. Following the argument in the two previous 
paragraphs, Type B uncertainty only affect choices, more specifically the search for a ‘good 
enough’ choice. Therefore, we suggest that heuristics in the fourth quadrant of the model 
warrant an alternative assessment of predictive capability reflecting these restrictions. Hence 
our proposition: 
P1: An a posteriori qualitative assessment of the overall decision outcome, potentially 
informed by subjective judgement, is better suited to study predictive capability of heuristics 
for choice under unknowable uncertainty, than a specific quantitative criterion. 
Second, as descriptive studies have revealed, practitioners use heuristics intuitively. Yet, we 
suggest that there is a difference in the effectiveness of this intuition for the two dimensions 
of the presented model. We argue that this difference results from the level of abstraction 
needed to make the correct selection. Decision tasks link in a non-abstract, direct way to 
decision-making practice, thus allow simple, intuitive selection. However, assessment of 
uncertainty – thus the selection of the ecologically rational heuristic – requires a higher level 
of abstraction of the decision context, which may not happen intuitively. Hence follows: 
P2: Practitioners are intuitively more effective in selecting a heuristic based on decision task 
than based on uncertainty type.  
Yet, expert heuristics are the result of learning and feedback (Rieskamp and Otto, 2011). 
Hence we suggest that both experience and education may increase the ability of practitioners 
to apply heuristics ecologically rational. Therefore we propose: 
P3a: Clear and timely feedback on decisions will increase the effectiveness of practitioners to 
select appropriate heuristics according to uncertainty type. 
P3b: Education of practitioners, enabling to reflect on the decision context, will increase the 
effectiveness of practitioners to select according to uncertainty type.    
When placing the scant research on heuristics in projects within the proposed model, we 
obtain an insight on its applicability and the validity of the propositions made before. We will 
demonstrate this with three examples: 
First, Mathews (2010) describes the use of fast-and-frugal trees for innovation project 
screening in a company case. Fast-and-frugal trees are, according to the model, suitable for 
judgement tasks under knowable (Type A) uncertainty. The presented case screened 
opportunities for alignment with the portfolio strategy, so the application for a judgement task 
(‘fits the strategy’) is in line with the model. Yet, as the study was purely descriptive, 
Mathews did not test the accuracy of the judgement. He thus does not provide insight on 
whether the heuristic fits the type of (dominating) uncertainty. A quantitative, performance 
oriented comparison with e.g. Tallying or Satisficing as choice, rather than judgement 
strategy, would constitute a worthwhile follow-up investigation. 
Second, Albar and Jetter (2011) similarly discuss the use of Take-the-Best and Tallying as a 
portfolio selection strategy at the front end. Other than Mathews, their focus is on the 
capability of the strategies to choose successful projects and reject unsuccessful ones, based 
on fuzzy information of 52 project simulations. As the simulations were based on pre-
determined influencing factors of the individual cues, the uncertainty within the sample 
pertained to Type A (only minor randomness in sample generation). The practical problem 
was thus choice under knowable uncertainty, and the selected two heuristics in line with the 
model propositions for this problem. Albar and Jetter found, that Tallying performed equally 
well as the best linear regression model used for comparison in the study. Take-the-Best 
outperformed all other models for selection of successful projects, yet showed low 
performance for rejecting unsuccessful projects. 
Third are two connected studies by Maytorena and Winch (Maytorena et al., 2007; Winch and 
Maytorena, 2009). These studies explored the cognitive processes of experts during risk 
identification in the front end phase of construction projects. Their research builds on the 
method of active information search coupled with cognitive mapping, and did not explicitly 
link to heuristics. Yet, they discovered that information search strategies that build on a series 
of connected cues, similar to fast-and-frugal trees (although not explicitly identified as such), 
performed better in identifying risks than a sequence of single cue strategies. This is in line 
with what the conceptual model would suggest for the described task: judgement (‘is a risk/is 
not a risk’) under knowable uncertainty (as the case was designed by the researchers, based on 
‘known’ risk profiles).  
 Discussion 
In this paper, we presented a systematic, common organization of project decisions and 
adaptive heuristics. We identified the need for such a new conceptual model to foster 
prescriptive research on heuristics in projects, as prior typologies did not systematically 
connect to the context of project decisions. To create a suitable presentation, we built on two 
dimensions: decision task (judgement, choice) and type of uncertainty (knowable, 
unknowable). Particularly we pointed to the importance of ‘unknowable uncertainty’, rooted 
in ambiguous success definitions, and unpredictability as projects shape the future as they 
proceed.  
Thereby, we contribute to project studies, practice and research on adaptive heuristics. For 
project studies, we presented a new theoretical concept to understand and improve expert 
decision-making, which has not yet received particular attention in the literature. Moreover, 
we provided a framework that is informative for descriptive and prescriptive research on 
decision-making in project, with applicability beyond adaptive heuristics. Finally, the 
presented model allows moving from the current dominating descriptive approach in the scant 
project literature on adaptive heuristics, to a prescriptive approach.  
For practice, we conclude that such a strengthened prescriptive research will contribute to the 
development of new robust and easy to apply decision tools. 
For the studies on adaptive heuristics, we contributed twofold. First, we proposed a new mode 
for organizing heuristics. This new approach is at a higher level of abstraction than previously 
presented typologies. It hence enables a discussion of the underlying theories beyond the 
contextual application. Second, we highlighted the boundaries of current discussions on 
ecological rationality and predictive capability regarding their focus on knowable uncertainty. 
This philosophical gap has previously not been explicitly addressed in the literature. It hence 
merits consideration and development of new measures for predictive capability.  
 
Yet, the proposed model is limited in three ways: 
First, uncertainty types are only one way to describe the decision context and organize the 
various individual definitions of ecological rationality. While we argue that it is a helpful 
concept, we acknowledge that there may be other suitable approaches. Especially with regards 
to heuristics that strive under knowable uncertainty, we suggest that a typology that considers 
individual roots of uncertainty – e.g. cue fuzziness, variability or variance of cue validity, etc. 
– may better inform the prescriptive research. Yet, such an organization would not support 
heuristics that strive in unknowable uncertainty, thus is limited in itself. 
Second, there is a debate within the adaptive heuristics research community, whether the 
structural description of the ‘three rules’ apply to all heuristics – already known or yet to be 
discovered. This applies particular to the concept of ‘simple rules’ (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 
2011), which are regularly mentioned in connection with heuristics, yet typically cannot be 
described through the three rules. While the proposed model would, in principle, allow a 
model-conform classification of individual simple rules, the classification regarding ‘decision 
task’ would need to be informed by other data than literature definitions of the ‘decision rule’. 
Third, there is an overlap of Type A and Type B uncertainty in ‘real-life’ project decisions. 
This may cloud the judgement of which is the dominating one and hence challenge the 
selection of a suitable heuristic. 
 
We believe, that while all those limitations are valid concerns with regard to the proposed 
model, they are less limiting than opening up new opportunities for research. We hence 
suggest that the proposed model in itself is valuable to identify both opportunities and 
limitations that can spark further research. 
 Conclusion and outlook to future research 
In summary, we have introduced adaptive heuristics as a novel decision strategy to project 
studies. We have supplemented this introduction with a conceptual model of project decisions 
and heuristics, which fosters prescriptive research and thus contributes to the development of 
new decision support strategies for practice.  
However, the proposed model is only a first, informative mode of organizing heuristics and is 
limited due to its simplicity. Thus we see two general opportunities for research to build on 
and develop the proposed conceptual model. These opportunities are first, further refinement 
of the model within the quadrants defined in Table 5. Second, testing the model through 
prescriptive research on various types of heuristics for one context, or one heuristic for 
various context. Such research will inform both further theorizing on adaptive heuristics and 
development of tools for project practice. 
Over the past decades, project research moved towards the actuality of practitioners, 
acknowledging the diversity and complexity of project decision-making. With the presented 
approach we contribute to a next step towards practice, allowing the development of 
pragmatic, yet theoretically sound approaches that fit the day-to-day life of practitioners. We 
have presented an open toolbox that warrants exploration by theory and practice alike. 
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